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A DECADE OF THE CELLER-KEFAUVER ANTI-MERGER ACT
CHARLES J. STEELE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations intent upon expanding via the acquisition route have
had three statutory hurdles placed in their way by the Congress of
the United States. As hurdles, the first two, the Sherman Act of
1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, were failures. A judiciary which
refused to give effect either to the language or intent of the acts nulli-
fied completely their usefulness as anti-merger weapons.
The third hurdle, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton
Act, was enacted in 1950. Relatively few judicial opinions have inter-
preted this act, "new section 7," as it is called. It is clear, however,
that it has little to fear in the way of a hostile judiciary or Federal
Trade Commission. So far at least, delays which can be characterized
only as incredible have been the sole serious problem for "new
section 7."
Shortly before the turn of the century, a great merger movement
began in the United States. Although the Sherman Act was the law
of the land, effective action under it could be taken only after a
monopoly had been achieved, if then. By 1914, it was clear to a ma-
jority of the Congress that, if the growing merger movement was to
be checked, new legislation was needed.
As enacted into law in 1914, section 7 of the Clayton Act contained
a civil prohibition against the acquisition of stock of one corporation
by another where the effect of the acquisition "may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so ac-
quired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain
such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a
monopoly of any line of commerce."1
President Wilson had hoped for a law which would prohibit anti-
competitive practices "in such terms as will practically eliminate
uncertainty."2 The uncertainty was eliminated by judicial interpreta-
tions very quickly, but in a way which left section 7 a worthless
piece of paper. As described by Judge Weinfeld in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.: 3
* Member, Whiteford, Hart, Carmody and Wilson, Washington, D.C.
1. 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
2. President Wilson's Message to Congress, 51 CONG. REC. 1978 (daily ed.
Jan. 20, 1914).
3. 168 F. Supp. 576, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). This decision, favorable to the
Department of Justice, was not appealed by Bethlehem Steel.
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Despite the clear purpose of the original section 7 of the Clayton Act,
its objectives were not fully realized. This frustration was generally
attributed to a number of factors. First, the statute applied only to
acquisitions of stock and did not apply to acquisitions of assets, and
even as to stock acquisitions it was interpreted as not to apply where
the stock was used to acquire assets. Second, it was generally assumed
that original section 7 did not apply to vertical mergers. The inadequacies
of the section, whatever the reasons, were further highlighted by pro-
nounced post war merger activity which resulted in the elimination by
large corporations of independent companies in industries which had
traditionally been considered small business fields. Congress showed
increasing concern with the sharp rise in economic concentration and
with the prospect of even greater concentration in the light of the
continuing merger trend. Further, the Columbia Steel case[4] brought
home the limitations of the Sherman Act in merger cases. It was against
this background that Congress amended section 7.
The fact that the original section 7 did not prohibit the acquisition
of assets was, in itself, a mortal failing. It left the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission helpless when assets, not
stock, were acquired, even though the economic effect was the same
in both cases.
Competition between an acquiring and acquired firm obviously
ended with the consummation of the acquisition. The original section
7 test of illegality-the lessening of competition between "the cor-
poration whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the
acquisition"-was, therefore, complied with in the case of every
acquisition, if the language of the statute was to be accepted literally.
What the courts did was to read into the Clayton Act the "rule of
reason" test of the Sherman Act. Only a substantial lessening of
competition, already achieved, seemed to be left open for attack under
section 7.5
From the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, until the 1957 Supreme
Court decision of United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.0
(hereinafter cited as Du Pont-General Motors), it was accepted as a
truism of anti-trust law that section 7 did not refer to vertical mergers.
When two competitors merged, it was a horizontal merger, and section
7 applied. When a supplier acquired an outlet, or when a seller ac-
quired its source of supply, it was a vertical merger, and section 7
did not apply.
For these and other reasons, the Clayton Act was no more an
effective anti-merger weapon than the Sherman Act had been.
In 1948, the Department of Justice failed, in United States v. Co-
4. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
5. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); Temple Anthracite
Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1931).
6. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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lumbia Steel Co.,7 to prevent the acquisition of Consolidated Steel by
United States Steel. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held
that the merger did not violate the Sherman Act. The majority made
much of the fact that no "intent" to monopolize had been proved.
The Columbia Steel decision, however, had its effect. Partly be-
cause of it, and after years of urging on the part of the Federal
Trade Commission, Congress in 1950 passed the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment to the Clayton Act.
The amended section 78 reads as follows:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corpora-
tion subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation en-
gaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part
of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of one or more corporations engaged in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by
the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
The changes effected were as follows: section 7 now (1) prohibited
the acquisitions of assets as well as stock; (2) eliminated the test of
whether the effect of the acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition between the acquired and the acquiring corporation; (3)
eliminated the test of whether the acquisition might restrain com-
merce in any community and substituted for it the test whether in
any line of commerce in any section of the country the acquisition
may substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly;
and (4) clearly applied to vertical as well as horizontal mergers.
Major mergers were still taking place at a rapid rate. They would
soon test the effectiveness of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment.
Amended section 7, as we have seen, had its own ground rules.
The enforcing agencies had to prove a reasonable probability of
adverse competitive effect, in a particular line of commerce, in at
least one section of the country. The courts and Federal Trade Com-
mission have now had slightly over ten years to develop the meaning
of these three concepts: (1) adverse competitive effect, (2) line of
commerce, and (3) section of the country.
7. 334U.S. 495 (1948).
8. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
1961 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
II. SECTION OF THE COUNTRY
The Senate report accompanying the 1950 amendment to section 7
contained the following language:
Although it is, of course, impossible to define rigidly what constitutes a
"section of the country", certain broad standards reflecting the general
intent of Congress can be set forth to guide the Commission and the
courts in their interpretation.
What constitutes a section will vary with the nature of the product.
Owing to the differences in the size and character of markets, it would
be meaningless, from an economic point of view, to attempt to apply
for all products a uniform definition of section, whether such a definition
were based upon miles, population, income, or any other unit of measure-
ment. A section which would be economically significant for a heavy,
durable product, such as large machine tools, might well be meaningless
for a light product, such as milk.9
Both the Bethlehem opinion of District Court Judge Weinfeld above,
and the initial decision of the hearing examiner in the Federal Trade
Commission's section 7 case of Proctor and Gamble Co.10 have quoted
this language of the Senate Report.
In Bethlehem the question of the section of the country was hotly
disputed. The government maintained that the country as a whole
as well as certain smaller areas within the country each constituted
a section of the country within the meaning of the act. The defend-
ant's position basically was that the country should be divided into
three sections, east, west and mid-continent.
Rejecting the defendant's position as "obvious gerrymandering,"
Judge Weinfeld said: 11
In addition, the geographic market for the purposes of determining the
impact of a merger can include all areas where the trade in a product
is affected by, and is not independent of, the trade in that product in
other areas-for example, if a change in price in one area has an effect on
price in another area both areas may be included in one geographic
market. Further, it must be remembered that amended section 7 is
not focused solely on the amount of competition between the two com-
panies which is eliminated by a merger. Its scope is much broader; it is
aimed at any substantial lessening of competition or tendency to monopoly
which may follow in the wake of a merger. Necessarily to be considered
is the situation that will exist after a merger. Even in a case where two
companies operate primarily in separate areas, a merger can have an
adverse effect on competition in that the enhanced strength of the merged
company may give it such an undue advantage in each area that com-
petition may be substantially lessened. In fact the defendants in this
9. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5,6 (1950).
10. No. 6901, FTC, June 15, 1961 (commission order to cease and desist).
See TRADE REG. REP. ff 15245.
11. 168 F. Supp. at 599-600.
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case argue that it is by virtue of its size and presence in all areas that
United States Steel exercises price leadership in the steel industry.
The court concluded that the proposed merger of Bethlehem and
Youngstown should be analyzed against the nation-wide market for
steel, as well as against "the smaller geographic areas where the
impact may be felt."
It is true that in most of the decisions construing amended sec-
tion 7, some effort has been made to show why the "section of the
country" chosen should somehow be considered an entity. In Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,12 for example,
the Second Circuit decided upon a ten-state area as the "section of the
country." The court explained: '
3
We think, however, that the relevance of the ten-state market was, on
the whole, sufficiently supported by evidence and findings. To the
south of this area were located the cane refineries of Louisiana including
that of Colonial; inside its northern perimeter and along its northwesterly
border were the factories of beet processors, including most of the plain-
tiff's factories. In this area, about two-thirds of all the sugar sold was
supplied by seven producers, three of whom were beet producers, viz.,
The Great Western Sugar Co., The Amalgamated Sugar Co., and the
plaintiff, and four of whom were cane refineries, viz., California and
Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp. (C & H), American Sugar Refinery Co.,
(American), and National Sugar Refining Co. (National), and Colonial.
Additional factors discussed by the court were the available cheap
river transportation and short railroad hauls in the area, the market
shares in the section of the acquiring and acquired firms, the per-
centage of the two firms' total sales which took place in the area, and
the fact that the merger, if consummated, would rank the defendant
second in volume of sales in the ten-state area.
In Crown Zellerbach, Corp., the Federal Trade Commission did the
Second Circuit one better and chose an eleven-state area as the
appropriate section of the country.' 4
Relative to respondent's contention as to the section of the country, we
are satisfied that in this instance the Eleven Western States, as found
by the hearing examiner, is an appropriate section. This area constitutes
the greater natural market for the western producers of the relevant
product and it is the market in which both Crown and Saint Helens made
the majority of their sales of this product.
Query: If the acquisition of St. Helens by Crown Zellerbach had
12. 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
13. Id. at 528.
14. 54 F.T.C. 769, 801 (1957). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the eleven-state area, selecting a three-state area instead, but




not adversely affected competition in the chosen eleven-state area,
but probably would have such an effect somewhere outside the
"market in which both Crown and Saint Helens made the majority
of their sales," would the Commission have dismissed the complaint?
I think it is quite obvious that such would not have been the case.
As a practical matter, the test is going to be, as Judge Weinfeld
pointed out in Bethlehem, the geographic areas where the impact may
be felt.
In other words, the attorneys of the Anti-Trust Division and Federal
Trade Commission study the impact of the merger to see if the ad-
verse competitive effect will result anywhere. That "anywhere" then
becomes the "section of the country," irrespective of whether the
"section" is a city, as in United States v. Brown Shoe Co.;15 a "con-
tiguous geographical area embracing the south shore area of Lake Erie
in the states of New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio," as in Erie Sand
& Gravel Co.;16 a metropolitan area, as in United States v. Maryland
& Va. Milk Producers Ass'n;7 or the whole country, as in A. G.
Spaulding Bros.18
On November 1, 1956, former FTC Chairman John W. Gwynne said
in a speech before the American Management Association in New
York:
Apparently the limits of a section of the country in any particular case
is not to be determined by geographical boundaries, but rather by the
realities of competition. Generally speaking, it is an area of effective
competition-a trade area. In determining its extent, consideration should
be given to many factors-the character of the product, its practical
transportability, its perishability, relation to competitors outside the
area, and many others.
In Bethlehem, Judge Weinfeld held that even where the merging
companies "operate primarily in separate areas," the merger may be
illegal. This is hardly limiting section of the country to "an area of
effective competition." Furthermore, as we shall see, the merger of
two companies who never competed anywhere may be challenged
under section 7 in today's anti-trust climate.
15. 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 363 U.S. 825 (1960).
16. No. 6670, FTC, Oct. 26, 1959 (order to cease and desist). The court of ap-
peals reversed the Commission. Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279,
282 (3d Cir. 1961). In so doing, the court pointed out that the Commission on
appeal had embraced a different section of the country than it had in its opin-
ion. Before the court the Commission, in effect, drew semicircles around docks
from which lake sand was unloaded. Had the Commission stood by its earlier
ruling of a 12-mile strip along the south shore of the lake, the effect upon
competition would have been much less in view of the Third Circuit's hold-
ing that lake and pit sand constituted one line of commerce. The case was
remanded to the Commission.
17. 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
18. No. 6478, FTC, March 30, 1960 (commission order to cease and desist).
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Likewise, in the opinion of the Federal Trade Commission in A. G.
Spaulding, the Commission quoting from Bethlehem said:
Section 7 is intended to protect buyers as well as competing sellers.
Therefore, section of the country must be determined with respect to
both buyers and sellers. The determination must be made on the basis
of not only where the companies have in the past made sales, but also
on the basis of where potentially they could make sales and where buyers
would reasonably turn to them as alternative substantial sources of
supply.19
III. URBAN AND RURAL
In the Commission's final Pillsbury Mills, Inc. decision, 0 a new
concept was superimposed on "section of the country." Two eco-
nomically significant sub-divisions of the southeast-a rural market
and an urban market-were held to be the pertinent sections of the
country. The opinion pointed out that some of the major companies
selling family flour in the southeast concentrated on the rural trade
and sold relatively little in metropolitan areas.
In a 1960 speech, former commissioner Edward Tait summed it up
accurately, I believe:
The appropriate locale may be where the acquirer or acquired do busi-
ness, but Section 7 is also "broad enough to cope with a substantial lessen-
ing of competition in any other section of the country, as well." The
market determination normally is made on the basis of both the actual
and potential sales areas of the merging corporations.
On February 27, 1961, the Supreme Court decided Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.21 Nashville Coal Company had tried to free
itself of its obligation under a contract with Tampa Electric on the
ground that the contract was an exclusive dealing contract which
violated section 3 of the Clayton Act3P The section of the country
involved was a crucial factor. The Court noted that the courts below
had been satisfied with inquiring only as to competition within penin-
sular Florida. The plaintiff had contended that the coal tonnage cov-
ered by the contract must be weighed against either the total
consumption of coal in (1) peninsular Florida; (2) all of Florida; (3)
the bituminous coal act area, comprising peninsular Florida and the
Georgia "finger"; or at most (4) all of Florida and Georgia. "If the
latter area were considered the relevant market, Tampa Electric's
proposed requirement would be 18% of the tonnage sold therein."
The Court commented:
We are persuaded that on the record in this case, neither peninsular
19. Id. at 8.
20. No. 6000, FTC, Dec. 16, 1960 (final order of divestiture).
21. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
22. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
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Florida, nor the entire State of Florida, nor Florida and Georgia com-
bined constituted the relevant market of effective competition. We do
not believe that the pie will slice so thinly. By far the bulk of the
overwhelming tonnage marketed from the same producing area as serves
Tampa is sold outside of Georgia and Florida, and the producers were
"eager" to sell more coal in those States. While the relevant competitive
market is not ordinarily susceptible to a "metes and bounds" definition,
it is of course the area in which respondents and the other 700 producers
effectively compete. The record shows that, like the respondents, they
sold bituminous coal "suitable for [Tampa's] requirements," mined in
parts of Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Alabama, Ohio and Illinois. We take notice of the fact that the approxi-
mate total bituminous coal (and lignite) product in the year 1954 from the
districts in which these 700 producers are located was 359,289,000 tons, of
which some 290,567,000 tons were sold on the open market. Of the latter
amount some 78,716,000 tons were sold to electric utilities. We also note
that in 1954 Florida and Georgia combined consumed at least 2,304,000
tons, 1,100,000 of which were used by electric utilities, and the sources
of which were mines located in no less than seven States. We take further
notice that the production and marketing of bituminous coal (and lignite)
from the same districts, and assumedly equally available to Tampa on a
commercially feasible basis, is currently on a par with prior years. In
point of statistical fact, coal consumption in the combined Florida-
Georgia area has increased significantly since 1954.23
While the Court rejected the Florida area as the appropriate
section of the country, it was saying, in effect, that the contract in
question could not have had the proscribed effect anywhere. Even
granted that "by far the bulk of the overwhelming tonnage marketed
from the same purchasing area as serves Tampa is sold outside of
Georgia and Florida," if the exclusive dealing contract had, for some
reason, a sufficiently adverse effect in Florida and Georgia, then I
believe the Supreme Court would have found a violation; Florida and
Georgia would have been an acceptable "section of the country."
As the law of new section 7 has developed, the section of the
country has not been determined by any pre-existing criteria. The
question rather has been, "Will the merger have a substantial effect
upon competition anywhere, be it city, state, nation or arbitrary area?"
If the answer is yes, the "anywhere" is the section of the country. In
the Union Carbide Corp. initial decision, the hearing examiner said:
The words "section of the country" obviously refer to the geographical
area in which a line of commerce moves in trade. In the present case,
we are fortunate in having no conflict between counsel as to the meaning
of the phrase "section of the country," because all counsel recognize that
respondent's products are bought and sold throughout the United States.
Accordingly, we may look anywhere in the United States for the effects
23. 365 U.S. at 332.
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of the acquisition upon the relevant line of commerce.2A
But is it necessary for respondents' products to be bought and sold
throughout the United States for the Commission to "look anywhere
in the United States for the effects of the acquisition?" I think not.
The present state of the law can be summed up, I believe, this way.
Find the forbidden effect. Where you find it, there is your section of
the country.
IV. LINE OF COIVIERCE
The prohibited competitive effect, which may take place in any
section of the country, must take place in at least one line of com-
merce. What constitutes a line of commerce is one of the thornier
problems connected with section 7.
In Du Pont-General Motors, a case decided under old section 7
but widely followed in subsequent cases brought under the amended
act, the question of the line of commerce involved was crucial. The
defendant maintained that section 7 was not violated by reason of
Du Pont's holding of General Motors stock because the total General
Motors market for finishes and fabrics constituted only a negligible
percentage of the total market for these materials for all uses, includ-
ing automotive uses.
The Court rejected all "finishes and fabrics" as the relevant lines
of commerce, stating:
Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a find-
ing of a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly
must be one which will substantially lessen competition "Within the area
of effective competition." Substantiality can be determined only in terms
of the market affected. The record shows that automobile finishes and
fabrics have sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them
products sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and fabrics to make
them a "line of commerce" within the meaning of the Clayton Act. Thus,
the bounds of the relevant market for the purposes of this case are not co-
extensive with the total market for finishes and fabrics, but are co-
extensive with the automobile industry, the relevant market for auto-
mobile finishes and fabrics. 5
Just the year before, in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. (hereinafter cited as Du Pont-Cellophane), the Supreme Court
had held:
The "market" which one must study to determine when a producer has
monopoly power will vary with the part of commerce under considera-
tion. These tests are constant. That market is composed of products
24. No. 6826, FTC, Feb. 27, 1961, at 7 (initial order to cease and desist).
(Emphasis added.)
25. 353 U.S. at 593-95.
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that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they
are produced-price, use and qualities considered. While the application
of the tests remains uncertain, it seems to us that du Pont should not
be found to monopolize cellophane when that product has the competition
and interchangeability with other wrappings that this record shows.26
Since the "interchangeability" test of Du Pont-Cellophane is in-
consistent with the "peculiar characteristics" test of Du Pont-General
Motors, much has been written and spoken concerning the relation-
ship of the two cases. One view is that the "interchangeability" test
of Du Pont-Cellophane is the proper test for a Sherman Act pro-
ceeding where, for some reason, the line of commerce should be
broader, but that the Du Pont-General Motors test of "peculiar
characteristics" is proper for a Clayton Act case. I believe a more
realistic view is one that stresses the change in personnel on the Court
between the two decisions. Justice Reed wrote the majority opinion
in Du Pont-Cellophane for Justices Burton, Minton, Frankfurter and
himself. Justices Warren, Black and Douglas dissented. Justices
Harlan and Clark took no part in the discussion. The following year,
in Du Pont-General Motors, Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for
the majority, and was joined by the dissenters of the Cellophane case
-Warren, Black and Douglas. Cellophane majority Justices Burton
and Frankfurter dissented. Justices Clark, Harlan and Whittaker
abstained.
Obviously, it is fairly simple to find "peculiar characteristics" wher-
ever you want to find them. Actual court and Federal Trade Com-
mission decisions subsequent to Du Pont-General Motors shed little
light on the standards against which a line of commerce is to be
judged. In fact, at least one Clayton Act opinion reverted to the "in-
terchangeability test" where the government's case was aided by so
doing. The Second Circuit, in American Crystal Sugar Co., mentioned
above, found beet and cane sugar to be interchangeable, and that both
kind of sugar, together, constituted one line of commerce.
In United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,27 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York also embraced
interchangeability. The government's position was that the line of
commerce was limited to the distribution of feature films to television
stations. The court thought otherwise, saying:
All competition must be considered, including competition faced by the
product in question from other products.
The tests enunciated by the authorities are consistent. Effectively, the
test "reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which (the prod-
ucts) are produced-price, use and qualities considered," and the test
26. 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
27. 1960 Trade Cas. ff 69766 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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"sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them products
sufficiently distinct . . . to make them a 'line of commerce' within the
meaning of the Clayton Act" are but different verbalizations of the same
criterion....
Inter-product competition has always been recognized where it has been
found to exist in effective degree. Where it is not found in effective de-
gree, the products are not competing and, therefore, cannot be included in
the same market. Their failure to compete, one with the other, may
be due to lack of suitability and interchangeability for the same uses,
differences in characteristics and, uses, or even because of psychological
or other factors.2 8
Because feature films were "interchangeable," the court found that
they did not have sufficient peculiar characteristics to constitute a
line of commerce.
In Erie Sand & Gravel, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
also seemed to fall back on functional interchangeability:
In its findings the Commission restricted the "line of commerce" con-
sidered and regulated to lake sand. However, the record is clear that
pit or bank sand also is used satisfactorily and on a large scale for the
making of concrete, including concrete which meets the high specifica-
tions of the federal government for building sand, although it may re-
quire preliminary washing not needed by lake sand, At more than
twenty places in the record there is positive testimony that bank or pit
sand has proved interchangeable with lake sand as a high-grade building
material. It is particularly significant that the record shows that in the
building of the Ohio and Pennsylvania Turnpikes and the New York
Thruway both types of sand met government specifications and were
used interchangeably. The Erie County, Pennsylvania, Thruway was
built entirely with pit and bank sand in 1957 and 1958. On the basis
of such evidence the brief of the government on this appeal concedes that
in 1956 at least 1,800,000 tons of pit and bank sand meeting government
specifications were sold, principally for concrete making, within twenty-
five miles of the southern shore of Lake Erie. In these circumstances, the
functional interchangeability of pit and bank sand with lake sand was
overwhelmingly established.2 9
This reasoning of course is cut from the same cloth as that of
the court in American Crystal Sugar Co. It is not, strictly speaking,
functional interchangeability in the sense of Du Pont-Cellophane.
If lake sand and bank sand are identical, and only the location or
processing is different, functional interchangeability may not be
present at all. There was some evidence, however, that lake sand
was of a higher, uniform quality than pit sand.
In an opinion widely criticized by the Federal Trade Commission
staff as indecisive and confusing,30 the Commission in its first Brillo
28. Id. 77007-08.
29. 291 F.2d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 1961). (Emphasis added.)
30. The author was on the trial staff of the FTC at the time, and this
assertion is based upon his own personal experience.
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Manufacturing Co. 31 opinion seemed to be unable to make up its mind
as to what constituted a line of commerce. It rejected the test of
the hearing examiner, saying:
We think the hearing examiner in concluding as a matter of law that
industrial steel wool was the relevant market erred in basing his
determinations solely on the fact that those were the wares being pro-
duced by the acquired and acquiring companies. The test instead is
whether these products are shown by the facts to have such peculiar
characteristics and uses as to constitute them sufficiently distinct from
others to make them a "line of commerce" within the meaning of the
Act. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957). That the acquired and acquiring corporations both made in-
dustrial steel wool was only one circumstance to be considered. Ad-
ditional factors which could have been taken into account include data
relating to the manner in which the products are marketed, their physical
characteristics, prices and possibility of other things bearing on the
question of whether or not they may be distinguished competitively from
other wares.
The opinion then went on to say, however:
As noted above, the issue as to the bounds of the relevant market in
Section 7 proceedings is one of fact. Thus, the respondent's right to
present evidence showing that products other than steel wool are in-
cluded within the area of effective competition, and, therefore, are a part
of the relevant line of commerce is fully protected.32
Certainly steel wool has characteristics peculiar enough to dis-
tinguish it from sandpaper, for example. The language quoted above,
however, seems to leave open the possibility of including sandpaper,
or some other abrasive, within the same line of commerce as steel
wool. A product which "effectively competes" with another product
may be said to be "reasonable interchangeable" with it. This test
is not the same as the "peculiar characteristics" test of the Supreme
Court in Du Pont-General Motors.
In distinguishing between classes of paper in its Crown Zellerbach33
decision, the Commission commented on the fact that there was evi-
dence of price variations as between such categories of paper or
paper board. This difference in price was one of the factors con-
sidered by the Commission in choosing a narrow line of commerce,
instead of all papers. The Second Circuit in American Crystal Sugar,
on the other hand, did not regard price difference as a "proper ele-
ment" in determining line of commerce.
In two amended section 7 decisions, a district court and the Federal
31. 54 F.T.C. 1905 (1958).
32. Id. at 1906.
33. 54 F.T.C. 769 (1957).
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Trade Commission had their cake and ate it too.
Judge Weinfeld, in United States v. Bethlehem Steel said he was
persuaded that the peculiar characteristics and uses standard was
"sound." He added:
Since there are no effective 'substitutes which compete with the various
lines of commerce as found by the Court, it is not necessary to discuss
the defendants' contention that the reasonable interchangeability test of
the Cellophane case is applicable here .... This does not, however, mean
that interchangeability can be ignored-a high degree of interchangeabil-
ity may under certain circumstances make it more or less the same
product.34
Judge Weinfeld then held the relevant lines of commerce to be (1)
hot rolled sheets, (2) cold rolled sheets, (3) hot rolled bars, (4)
buttweld pipe, (5) electric weld pipe, (6) seamless pipe, (7) oil field
equipment, (8) oil field equipment and supplies, (9) tin plate, (10)
track spikes, (11) the iron and steel industry as a whole. He con-
cluded that there was a reasonable probability that the merger of
Bethlehem and Youngstown would, in violation of section 7, sub-
stantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly in each
of these eleven lines of commerce in some section of the country.
In arriving at his line of commerce, Judge Weinfeld selected the
whole as well as some of the component parts.
In A. G. Spaulding & Bros.,35 the Federal Trade Commission did the
same thing. The athletic goods industry as a whole was labeled a
line of commerce, as were individual items, such as baseballs, foot-
balls, badminton rackets, and others. In fact, there was a further
breakdown, and expensive baseballs were held to be a separate line
of commerce from cheap baseballs; expensive basketballs, a separate
line of commerce from cheap basketballs.
The Commission opinion stated:
One of the most significant points in the entire record is that Spaulding
and Rawlings were engaged primarily in the production and sale of
athletic goods in the higher-priced, higher-quality line. It is, therefore,
within this higher quality line of the various product lines that an
appraisal of the competitive effect of the merger should properly be
made. The manufacture and sale of the low price line of athletic goods
involves an entirely different market and may be completely disregarded
in making this appraisal.3
Why did the court in Bethlehem and the Commission in Spaulding
find it necessary to add the industry as a whole to the more narrow
lines of commerce, such as cold rolled steel and expensive baseballs?
34. 168 F. Supp. 576, 593 & n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
35. No. 6478, FTC, March 30, 1960 (commission order to cease and desist).
36. Id. at 11.
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I believe that the word "concentration" supplies the answer. If a
merger results in measurable concentration in an industry, in today's
anti-trust climate it will be challenged. If a fair-sized firm disappears
from an industry because of an acquisition, a complaint will almost
surely follow. In Spaulding, for example, a large sporting goods
manufacturer was acquired. Its absence from competition would be
felt throughout the entire country. While the Commission might deny,
as it did in Brillo, that this alone is enough to support a section 7
order, I think it will be a long time before the acquisition of a firm
the size of Rawlings will be unchallenged. The effect of the acquisi-
tion on expensive baseballs, or cold rolled steel, may be stressed in
the opinion. The disappearance of a fair-sized competitor from the
industry as a whole, I submit, is a factor to which great weight is
given in today's practical anti-trust world. If that is present, lines of
commerce in which competition may be adversely affected will be
found.37
V. COMPETITIVE EFFECT
The crux of the section 7 case is the presence, or absence, of the
reasonable probability that competition will be substantially (and
adversely) affected as a result of the merger or acquisition. If there
is a reasonable probability that competition will be substantially
lessened, or a tendency to monopoly created, then the acquisition is
unlawful.
The translation of this rather vague statutory standard into more
concrete criteria has understandably been a difficult task for the
courts and the Federal Trade Commission. Economist Irston Barnes
has spotlighted one of the difficulties: "A merger case is essentially an
economic problem tried in a legal form according to legal rules before
judges who are generally unschooled in the technical aspects of the
economics of competition." 38
37. What constitutes a line of commerce is also discussed in FTC opinions
involving Pillsbury Mills, Docket No. 6000; Proctor and Gamble, Docket No.
6901; Reynolds Metals, Docket No. 7009; and Union Carbide, Docket No. 6826.
The Ninth Circuit in FTC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. (unreported at present)
gave the following as its concept of a line of commerce:
'We know of no rule which would require that the Commission in-
clude in its designated relevant product market every item sold by
St. Helens regardless of its size or importance. All that the Com-
mission was required to do was to ascertain and find a product line
which was sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade
rules.... In the statutory phrase 'in any line of commerce,' the word
entitled to emphasis is 'any.' Any line of commerce does not mean
the same as the entire line of commerce, or all lines of commerce en-
gaged in or touched upon by the acquired concern. The line of
commerce need not even be a large part of the business of any of
the corporations involved."
38. Speech Before the Federal Bar Association, Sept. 26, 1958.
1062 [ VOL.. 14
CELLER-KEFAUVER ACT
VI. TYPES OF MERGERS
When competitors merge, the result is a horizontal acquisition.
When a customer merges with his supplier, the result is a vertical
acquisition. When two completely different companies, such as
Proctor and Gamble and Clorox merge, the jargon of anti-trust bap-
tizes it as a conglomerate merger. Any of the three types may be
challenged under the Clayton Act, if the forbidden adverse effect
upon competition seems to be lurking in either the present or the
future.
In Du Pont-General Motors, The Supreme Court stated" the law
in quite general terms:
We hold that any acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of
the stock of another corporation, competitor or not, is within the reach
of the section whenever the reasonable likelihood appears that the
acquisition will result in a restraint of commerce or in the creation of a
monopoly of any line of commerce. Thus, although du Pont and
General Motors are not competitors, a violation of the section has oc-
curred if, as a result of the acquisition, there was at the time of suit a
reasonable likelihood of a monopoly of any line of commerce.J39] The
market affected must be substantial. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357. Moreover, in order to establish a violation
of § 7 the Government must prove a likelihood that competition may be
"foreclosed in a substantial share of . . . [that market]." Both require-
ments are satisfied in this case. The substantiality of a relevant market
comprising the automobile industry is undisputed. The substantiality of
General Motors' share of that market is fully established in the evidence.40
This language is not much help in the way of a yardstick. General
Motors was obviously Number One in the giant automobile industry.
Du Pont was its major supplier of automobile paints and finishes (a
line of commerce). Du Pont's acquisition of a controlling interest in
General Motors, therefore, created a reasonable probability that
competitors of Du Pont would be foreclosed from selling paints and
finishes to General Motors. "The inference is overwhelming that
Du Pont's commanding position was promoted by its stock interest and
was not gained solely on competitive merit.' '41 The acquisition, there-
fore, was struck down.
The Du Pont-General Motors decision caused considerable concern
for many reasons. One was the pronouncement that an action under
section 7 would lie anytime, even decades after the merger. ;When-
ever the Department of Justice felt that a merger might, in the
future, have an adverse affect upon competition, it could file a com-
plaint, even if the merger had been completed many years before.
39. 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957).
40. Id. at 595.
41. Id. at 605.
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In view of the fogginess of the concept, "substantially to lessen com-
petition," it is little wonder that Du Pont-General Motors's evergreen
theory of susceptibility to suit under section 7 caused worried com-
ment -from those whose present position in the business world was
built on mergers.
So far, at least, there has been no general attack on middle-age
mergers.
VII. EASE OF ENTRY
In American Crystal Sugar Co., mentioned above, the Second
Circuit laid considerable stress on "ease of entry" into the market,
or at least on "history of entry" into the market. The court went
along with the district court.
[T]he evidence indicates that no new sugar refineries can be anticipated.
In the last thirty years, no new firms have entered the industry .... On
the whole, we think the attack on these findings at most suggests that
they were possibly somewhat extreme and that it does not seriously
disturb the conclusion that the sugar industry, due largely to the quota
system under the National Sugar Act, is peculiarly inhospitable to in-
cursions from outside entrepreneurs.4 2
There is no question but that "ease of entry" and its related
concept "concentration in the market" are two factors which will be
studied closely by the courts and the Federal Trade Commission in
any merger case. "Market concentration in the sanitary paper
products industry is high," the Commission commented in Scott
Paper Co.543 and ordered divestiture. In its opinion on the second
interlocutory appeal in Brillo, the Commission chastised a hearing
examiner for ignoring "the great and perhaps conclusive weight
to be given to these very same considerations [i.e., Brillo's share of the
market] when viewed in connection with an already existing heavy
industry concentration...."4
In Erie Sand & Gravel, mentioned above, the concentration found
by the Commission was quite pronounced:
There are, in addition, other significant factors. The merger eliminated
a major competitor. Where formerly there has been several suppliers in
port cities, such as Dunkirk, New York; Sandusky, Ohio; and Erie,
Pennsylvania; now there is one. Respondent also has acquired possession
or leases to most of the available docks in the market area. It is now
the only producer which supplies sand at all ports from Buffalo, New
York to Sandusky, Ohio.
The facts of record further reveal that there is little likelihood of
42. 259 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1958).
43. No. 6559, FTC, Dec. 1, 1960, at 10 (final order of divestiture).
44. No. 6557, FTC, at 3.
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greater competition in the future. Kelley Island Company, incident to
the terms of the acquisition, is prohibited from re-entry into the relevant
market for ten years. Other competitors of respondent are small opera-
tors with limited means. They do not have docks or other facilities which
might enable them to effectively challenge the respondent's now domi-
nant position. It is evident that the effect of the acquisition by
respondent of the assets of Sandusky Division may be substantially to
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in the market as
defined above.45
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk
Producers Ass'n,4 found that the district court's findings that
the acquisition of Embassy Dairy by the Association would "elimi-
nate the largest purchaser of non-Association milk in the area" and
increase the Association's control of the Washington market, were
supported by the record. The Supreme Court concluded that these
findings, and others, properly led to the conclusion that the acquisi-
tion of Embassy Dairy by the co-op tended to create a monopoly or
substantially lessen competition and was, therefore, a violation of
section 7.
Concentration was likewise stressed in the Commission's decisions
in Pillsbury ("A further factor in the concentration trend is the al-
most complete lack of new entries in the family flour business in
the Southeast"),47 and in Spaulding ("Three firms instead of four
now control approximately 50% of the market for all athletic goods
and considerably more than 50% of the market for higher quality
products") .48
Certainly one of the most intelligent and experienced of anti-trust
lawyers is the present Director of the Bureau of Anti-Restrictive
Practices of the Federal Trade Commission, Joseph E. Sheehy. Speak-
ing on September 26, 1958, before the Federal Bar Association, he
quoted the following language from Georgetown Law Journal:
A substantial lessening of competition or a tendency toward monopoly
arises either from a reduction in competitive opportunities or a reduction
in the incentives to compete. Since the antimerger law must generally
be applied prospectively, the economic analysis of mergers must be
focused primarily on changes in the competitive structure of industry
and markets, evaluated in the light of the competitive behavior of the
relevant industry and market, and perhaps of other competitively similar
industries and markets.49
Mr. Sheehy went on:
45. No. 6670, FTC, Oct. 26, 1959, at 6-7.
46. 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
47. No. 6000, FTC, Dec. 16, 1960, at 16.
48. No. 6478, FTC, March 30, 1960, at 13.
49. Barnes, Competitive Mores and Legal Tests in Merger- Cases: The
Du Pont-General Motors Decision, 46 GEo. L.J. 564, 629 (1958).
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In my opinion, in a market where there are only four or five significant
producers and one acquires another, a showing of the relevant standing
of the companies before and after the acquisition should be enough to
establish a prima facie case. The productive capacity, actual production
or sales of these companies could be obtained and compared with total
industry figures where usable figures were available. If the results show
that four companies held 90% of the market in about equal proportions
and that the remaining 10% was held by a dozen others, it would seem
that nobody could contend that a merger of any two of the top four
would not create a presumption of a substantial lessening of competition.
There would be no need for a more detailed analysis, no call for
consideration of other factors or characteristics. In my opinion, at least,
this would present such an undue reduction in the number of competing
enterprises as to bring it within the language used in the reports of the
Congressional committees.
If there is concentration within a line of commerce, the Commission
and courts will pounce upon that fact. Scott Paper sums it up:
"One of the major purposes of amended section 7 was to ward off
anti-competitive effects of increases in the level of economic concen-
tration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions."50
Logically, lack of concentration should weigh heavily on the side of
the lawfulness of the merger.
VIII. Loss OF A COMPETITOR
The removal of a "vigorous" competitor from a line of commerce
is another factor the Commission and courts have looked to in finding
violation of section 7. The concept is similar to concentration, but if
a vigorous competitor is removed via acquisition, it will be held
against the merger whether the particular industry involved is con-
centrated or not.
In Bethlehem the court stated:
There may be a substantial lessening of competition or tendency to
monopoly when a merger substantially increases concentration, eliminates
a substantial factor in competition, eliminates a substantial source of
supply, or results in the establishment of relationships between buyers
and sellers which deprive their rivals of a fair opportunity to compete.
The proposed merger between Bethlehem and Youngstown would have
each of these proscribed effects. The substantiality of these effects is
beyond question.5 '
In its final decision in Pillsbury, the Commission pointed out that
Ballard, a firm acquired by Pillsbury, was one of the few regional
companies in the Southeast in a position to compete effectively with
large nationwide distributors such as Pillsbury and General Mills.
50. No. 6559, FTC, Dec. 1, 1960, at 10.
51. 168 F. Supp. 576, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). (Citations omitted.)
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Especially was this true, the Commission found, in the urban centers
where premium brands dominated the sales. It was "clear," there-
fore, to the Commission, that the acquisition of Ballard removed an
important and effective competitor from the southeastern market.
"Of particular significance," the Commission said in its opinion
which ordered Spaulding to divest itself of Rawlings, was the fact
that immediately prior to the merger Rawlings was experiencing
a period of rapid growth and expansion. "The immediate effect of
the acquisition, therefore, was the elimination of a substantial com-
petitive factor in the production and sale of athletic goods, leaving
the general line concerns, Wilson and MacGregor, as the only firms
having the capacity to compete on equal terms with Spaulding."52
And in the Federal Trade Commission proceeding against Scott
Paper, the Commission found that although none of the three acquired
companies marketed products similar to Scott trade products, all
three were potential competitors of Scott in the production and sale
of finished sanitary paper products.
IX. MARKET SHARE
Other factors are considered, such as the probable effect of the
merger on price. ("Respondent's and Ballard's prices differed on dif-
ferent locations prior to the acquisition. Afterward, the prices of
the two brands became identical.) "5 So, too, the history of acquisitions
by the acquiring firm has been mentioned in opinions.54 Both the courts
and the Commission, however, have given most of their attention to
the concept of "market share." What was the share of the relevant
market, or line of commerce, which the acquiring firm had prior to
the acquisition? What was the share of the relevant market which
the acquired firm had prior to the acquisition? What is the share
of the relevant market which the acquiring, or new, firm has now
that the merger has taken place? Does this new, combined market
share indicate a reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of
competition or a tendency to monopoly? These are some of the most
important questions the courts and the Federal Trade Commission ask.
The question of market share arises primarily in connection with
the horizontal merger. In vertical and conglomerate mergers, the
merging concerns are not manufacturing or selling the same items at
the same level. If they were, the merger would be horizontal. A
Commission hearing examiner has held in a conglomerate merger case,
however, that the market share of the acquired firm would probably
52. No. 6478, FTC, March 30, 1960 (commission order to cease and desist).
53. No. 6000, FTC, Dec. 16, 1960 (final order of divestiture).




be increased, to the detriment of competition, because of the money
the acquiring firm would probably spend on advertising the products
of the acquired firm.55 Indeed, this theory was the principle basis for
the issuance of the complaint. This reasoning of the Commission
would apply with equal force to vertical mergers.
The Federal Trade Commission twice has emphatically stated that
increased market share alone, apparently no matter how large, will
not support a finding that section 7 of the Clayton Act has been
violated. In the opinion deciding the 1953 interlocutory appeal in
Pillsbury, then Chairman Edward F. Howrey said:
Competition cannot be directly measured; no single set of standards can
be applied to the whole range of American industries. No single
characteristic of an acquisition would of itself be sufficient to determine
its effect on competition. For this reason it would not be sufficient to
show that an acquiring and an acquired company together control a
substantial amount of sales, or that a substantial portion of commerce
is affected.56
Mr. Howrey added:
As we understand it, the Federal Trade Commission has a greater task
than this in administering the broad provisions of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. There must be a case-by-case examination of all relevant
factors in order to ascertain the probable economic consequences. 57
At the time of this decision, many Commission attorneys predicted
that it would kill amended section 7. Orders of divestiture in sub-
sequent cases proved that section 7 survived. The Pillsbury case
itself, however, is still rolling on some eight years later, mostly
because Pillsbury was allowed to present an "examination of all
relevant factors" all over the country for a number of years.
Chairman Howrey left the Commission, but the principles of the
Pillsbury decision on the interlocutory appeal were later affirmed
in Brillo.
In his initial decision of October 15, 1957, the hearing examiner in
Brillo stated as follows:
The record herein shows that in 1954, the year preceding the acquisition,
Brillo's share of the national household market amounted to 45.3%,
S.O.S.'s share of that market amounted to 50.9%, whereas Williams' share
of the household market amounted to 3/10 of 1%. If the acquisition of
a company which has 8/10 of 1% of the market is so insubstantial that
it could not possibly lessen competition, it follows that an acquisition
involving 1/3 of 1% of the market is so insubstantial that it could not
55. Proctor & Gamble. Co., No. 6901, FTC, July 11, 1961 (initial order to
cease and desist).
56. 50 F.T.C. 555, 564 (1953).
57. Id. at 565.
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possibly lessen competition. Since it cannot, it cannot be found to be a
violation of Section 7.58
The S/o of 1% was a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court
in FTC v. Western Meat Co.5 9
With respect to the industrial steel wool market, the record in
Brillo shows that Brillo was the number one producer with 29.1% of
the market and Williams was the number four producer with 18.2%
of the market. Hearing Examiner Robert Piper stated, in effect, that
these figures made out a per se violation:
The legislative history, the various decisions under the Clayton Act
involving the same statutory standard for evaluating effect, and Du Pont-
General Motors, the most recent decision of the Supreme Court involving
Section 7, as well as inherent logic demonstrate that an acquisition which
involves a substantial share of the relevant market must of necessity
have a reasonable probability of substantially lessening competition in
that market.6O
On the first interlocutory appeal in Brillo, the Commission, with
Commissioner Secrest writing the opinion, rejected this reasoning of
the hearing examiner:
We do not concur in the holding that a significant increase in a producer's
already substantial share of the market necessarily demonstrates likeli-
hood of statutorily forbidden effects in every distributional situation.
This is not to say that the dimensions of the market segment being
eliminated from competition between merging corporations may not in
some evidentiary situations support inferences of substantial anticom-
petitive effects. Nevertheless, informed determinations as to actual or
probable competitive effects can only be based on an analysis of all facts
of record pertaining to the relevant market. In addition to the facts
concerning market shares, likewise important is such evidence as was
received herein pertaining to the general competitive situation, number
of competitors and degree of concentration prevailing in the industry.
Hence, it was error for the hearing examiner to find as a matter of law
that the record showing of substantiality of the market shares involved
in the acquisition established a violation of section 7.61
The court in Columbia Pictures, mentioned above, agreed with the
Commission in its view of the importance to be given "market share,"
saying: "Statistics dealing with only rank and percentages do not by
themselves suffice to describe whether the vigor of competition has
been affected."
62
The Commission in Brillo also rejected Hearing Examiner Piper's
58. No. 6557, FTC, at 15.
59. 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
60. No. 6557, FTC, at 14.
61. 54 F.T.C. 1905, 1907 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
62. 1960 Trade Cas. ir 69,766, at 77,018.
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dismissal of the line of commerce involving household steel wool:
In 1954, the year preceding the acquisition, the share of the household
market for steel wool held by the acquired corporation comprised 3/10
of 1 percent. In such year, the hearing examiner noted, the respondent's
share of that market was 45.3 percent, which was exceeded only by one
other manufacturer. Because no area of substantial competition had
previously existed between the acquired and acquiring companies in the
household line of commerce, he concluded that no substantial lessening
of competition could result from the acquisition. The facts emphasized
by the courts in the decisions cited by the hearing examiner in support
of his holding differ materially from those apparently presented in this
proceeding. Hence, those decisions construing section 7 prior to its
amendment are not deemed controlling to decision here. . . . For the
reasons set forth above, we think the ruling granting the motion to
dismiss as to the household line of commerce for steel wool is based on
an improper standard. That the household market share of the acquired
corporation had been less than 1 percent was a circumstance as to which
due cognizance was to be taken. It was error, however, for the hearing
examiner to deem such fact exclusively controlling as a matter of law
and to fail to accord due consideration to other relevant market informa-
tion of record, including post-acquisition production and marketing
data.63
On remand, hearing examiner Piper stated that there was no
evidence to show a violation of section 7 other than the substantial
market share involved with respect to industrial steel wool. He
accordingly dismissed the complaint. On interlocutory appeal, he was
again reversed by the Commission in an opinion dated March 25,
1960, written by Commissioner Kern. This opinion stated:
It seems to us that the hearing examiner's first ruling upon the motion
which, upon appeal, we reversed and remanded, was unduly preoccupied
with pursuing the so-called quantative substantiality doctrine-in this
case to a point unjustified by exisiting judicial precedents interpreting
the requirements of Section 7 of the Clayton Act-and thereby gave
overwhelming consideration to market shares to the complete exclusion
of all other relevant economic factors. However, the hearing examiner
in the initial decision now before us on appeal, with an ambivalence
that we deem unjustified by our remand direction, seems repelled by
that which he once embraced. He now ignores the great and perhaps
conclusive weight to be given to these very same considerations when
viewed in connection with an already existing heavy industry concentra-
tion and other relevant record facts.64
On this appeal, the Commission also said the following factors
should be considered in a section 7 case: the difficulty of new entries;
the disparity in resources and sales volume between Brillo and
63. 54 F.T.C. 1905, 1907-08 (1958).
64. No. 6557, FTC, at 2-3. (Emphasis added.)
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other producers, excluding S.O.S.; the merger's effect on price; the
fact that the acquiring firm was a "price leader"; the fact that there
had been progressive losses of market shares in the industrial line
of commerce by the smaller producers for several years preceding
the acquisition and concomitant gains by Brillo; and the great
disparities in financial resources which theretofore existed between
respondent and all but one of the other producers were widened by
the acquisition, the increased productive capacity in the acquiring
firm, and the tendency to industry concentration.
The opinion concluded:
Bearing in mind that aggravation of an existing oligopoly framework
comes within the statutory concept of "tend to create a monopoly,"
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., . . . the foregoing market facts
reasonably support the inference that respondent's acquisition has
operated to intensify the market concentration which theretofore existed
in the household field. It, therefore, is not controlling that the share
held by Williams was a fraction of one percent. The Act also encompasses
minute acquisitions which tend to monopoly.6 5
The view of the Commission that greatly increased market share
to a predominant .degree is not enough by itself to show a violation,
but is "perhaps conclusive," will do little to clarify the law of sec-
tion 7. Query: If General Motors and Ford merged, would the Com-
mission have to spend years, as it did in Pillsbury, receiving evidence
as to matters other than market share?
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently taken a
different approach. In Crown Zellerbach the court was critical of the
"all relevant factors" approach of Pillsbury and Brilla, stating:
Crown, with its leadership in production and sales of the product line
papers, its great disparity in size as compared with other competitors
in the area, and its position as a price leader in the market, was already
in a dominant position before the merger. Its acquisition of St. Helens
could not help but substantially increase that dominance. It significantly
added to its concentration of power. To borrow a phrase from Universal
Camera v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, 487, Congress expressed a mood
that acquisition of a rival firm by a larger one, resulting in a sub-
stantial increase in the concentration of power in the absorbing concern,
is to be prohibited for the reason that such increased opportunity for
dominance will probably lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
It is its tendency to concentration of power that condemns this merger.
This alone justified the Commission's finding that the reasonable probable
result of the acquisition would be substantially to lessen competition
and tend to create a monopoly.66
In Bethlehem, market share of the proposed, combined firm was
65. No. 6557, FTC, at 9-10.
66. This case, decided in 1961, is unreported at present.
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emphasized by the court in prohibiting the consummation of the
merger, but many other factors were considered. Even where very
large market shares were involved, as in Crown Zellerbach, other
factors were looked into by the Commission even if the Ninth Circuit
felt later that it was unnecessary.
Respondent produced 51.5 percent and St. Helens 11.0 percent of the
relevant product in the West in 1953, for a total of 62.5 percent of the west-
ern production. This clearly constituted a predominant share of the mar-
ket considering its relative isolation. One immediate result of the
acquisition was to remove from the Western supplier market an im-
portant, fully integrated competitor having its own timber reserves, pulp
manufacturing and converting facilities and fully developed sales outlets
to the trade. Another immediate result was to increase significantly the
size of respondent in the relevant line of commerce in which it already
had a commanding lead.
Respondent, a company which produced in the West in 1953, 56.2 percent
of all the paper produced in the area and 27.3 percent of the paper and
paperboard production combined, was by far the leading producer in the
relevant line of papers with 51.5 percent of the total ...
Clearly, with the elimination of St. Helens, western jobbers generally
have been severely restricted as to sources from which the relevant
papers may be purchased. It likewise appears that many converters
which formerly could look to St. Helens for purchases of the relevant
papers must now depend upon Crown as a primary source of supply, a
company which is a major competitor since Crown converts a sub-
stantial share of its production. 67
In Erie Sand & Gravel, the Commission found the combined market
share to be even greater.
Respondent's sales, when added to those of the Sandusky Division
amounted to 86.8% of all lake sand sold in the relevant market in 1953,
and 83.7% of such sales in 1954. Respondent and the Sandusky Division,
combined, sold 91.8% of all domestic lake sand sold in the relevant market
in 1954. Two other domestic suppliers shared the remainder between them
in 1954, with sales of approximately 4.9% and 3.3% respectively. Thus,
respondent, through the merger, had showed dominance in the relevant
market.6
In most merger cases, evidence as to market share will not be
sufficient to support a finding of a violation of section 7. It will not be
enough by itself to be "perhaps conclusive." Factors such as affect on
price; competition; number and strength of remaining competitors;
ability of the new, merged firm to compete with larger competitors;
and others should be considered. Where, however, the increased mar-
67. 54 F.T.C. 1905, 1907-08 (1958).
68. No. 6670, FTC, Oct. 26, 1959 (commission order to cease and desist),
later reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
291 F.2d 279 (1961).
1072 [ VOL. 14
CELLER-KEFAUVER ACT
ket share of the two merging firms places it head and shoulders above
all its competitors, certainly a prima facie case has been made out and
the respondent should be held to considerably less than five or six
years in defending the action by showing other "relevant factors."
X. VERTICAL MERGERS
When a customer acquires a source of supply, such as a manu-
facturer or producer, the merger is christened "backward vertical."
When a producer or manufacturer acquires a sales outlet, a "forward
vertical" merger results. The tests of illegality are still the reasonable
probability (1) of a substantial lessening of competition and (2)
of a tendency to monopoly, but the criteria are different. "Market
share" is modified to "share of the market foreclosed," on the theory
that a parent will buy from its subsidiary or affiliated company to the
exclusion of competitors. The proposed Bethlehem-Youngstown
merger, blocked by a United States district court, provides us with a
clear example.
Rope wire is used in the manufacture of wire rope. Bethlehem
Steel manufactured both rope wire and wire rope. Judge Weinfeld
found that Youngstown, which did not manufacture wire rope, was
an important and substantial supplier of rope wire to independent,
non-integrated fabricators of wire rope. These independent com-
panies, who had been buying rope wire from Youngstown, which
was not a competitor of theirs in the sale of wire rope, would now
be faced with the combined Bethlehem-Youngstown organization and
Bethlehem was a competitor of theirs in the sale of wire rope.
Thus, were Youngstown to be acquired by Bethlehem there would be
removed from the market one of the only six companies in the United
States which are the most desirable noncompetitive sources of supply
of rope wire for the nonintegrated independent wire rope fabricators....
As to the other facet of the vertical effect of the proposed merger,
since Bethlehem is a producer of wire rope, the reasonable probability
is that Bethlehem would supply its own requirements so that Youngstown
would no longer be a market for the independent fabricators.69
The Federal Trade Commission proceeding against Gulf Oil Cor-
poration, for its acquisition of Warren Petroleum, presented a some-
what similar situation.70 The acquisition of Warren by Gulf was
primarily vertical because Gulf, a producer, had acquired Warren,
primarily a marketer. Warren had been a major supplier of liquified
petroleum gas to independent dealers who had competed with Gulf's
"Gulftane" dealers in certain sections of the country where Warren
69. 168 F. Supp. 576, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
70. No. 6689, FTC, Jan. 5, 1960 (consent order to cease and desist).
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did not market at retail. These independent dealers had bought
their LP gas from Warren which was not their competitor. After the
acquisition of Warren by Gulf, Warren had become their competitor.
Also, Warren did not sell fuel oil. Gulf, of course, does. Therefore,
two competing fuels, LP gas and fuel oil, were both controlled by
Gulf, whereas before the merger, Warren's LP gas was a competitor
of Gulf's fuel oil as well as its LP gas.
A strictly vertical aspect of the Gulf-Warren merger was that
Warren had bought most of the LP gas which it marketed, although
it did produce some. Prior to the merger, any producer could sell
its LP gas to Warren. Following the merger, there can be but little
doubt that Gulf would occupy a favored position as a supplier to
Warren, and Warren a favored position as a customer of Gulf. When
LP gas was in great volume, as it sometimes is, Gulf could unload
on Warren, to the possible detriment of Gulf's competitors. When LP
gas was scarce, as it sometimes is, Warren could get a supply from
Gulf, to the possible detriment of Warren's competitors, who would
not be able to buy from Gulf.
The difference between Gulf-Warren and Bethlehem-Youngstown
was in the outcome. The Department of Justice successfully blocked
the latter merger, but the Federal Trade Commission entered into a
consent settlement which allowed the Gulf-Warren merger to stand.
The Du Pont-General Motors case was vertical in nature, in that a
supplier owned a controlling interest in a customer. As the court
framed the issue:
The primary issue is whether du Pont's commanding position as General
Motors' supplier of automotive finishes and fabrics was achieved on
competitive merit alone, or because its acquisition of the General Motors'
stock, and the consequent close intercompany relationship, led to the
insulation of most of the General Motors' market from free competition,
with the resultant likelihood, at the time of the suit, of the creation
of a monopoly of a line of commerce. 71
The Court concluded that the inference was "overwhelming" that
Du Pont's commanding position was promoted by its stock interest
and was not gained solely on competitive merit.
If one restricts oneself to the law and the decisions, it is difficult
to generalize about the adverse competitive effect necessary to make
out a violation of section 7 in a vertical merger case. In the practical
realm, under the present Justice Department and Federal Trade
Commission, when a big customer merges with a big supplier, I
believe a challenge under section 7 will follow irrespective of other
factors to which lip service is paid.
71. 353 U.S. at 588.
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XI. CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
The principal case involving a conglomerate merger, so far, is the
challenge by the Federal Trade Commission to the acquisition of
Clorox by Proctor and Gamble32 When Proctor and Gamble acquired
Clorox, it neither manufactured nor marketed a bleach such as
Clorox. There was, therefore, no question of combined market
shares. There was also no question of a market foreclosure, because
Clorox had not been a customer of Proctor and Gamble or of Proctor
and Gamble's competitors. The merger was clearly "conglomerate."
The position of the hearing examiner in Proctor & Gamble, unfor-
tunately for Proctor and Gamble, had been put very succinctly in a
press release issued by Proctor and Gamble at the time of the
merger. It said: "Taking over the Clorox business, however, could be
a way of achieving a dominant position in the liquid bleach market
quickly which would pay out reasonably well."
The initial decision in Proctor & Gamble was concerned largely
with the amount and types of advertising and promotional work
which Proctor and Gamble could bring to bear to push a product.
The examiner discussed the time that Proctor and Gamble, through
advertising and promotional events, managed to keep Purex out of the
Erie, Pennsylvania, market to any great extent. An indirect result
of this was that P urex acquired the John Duhl Products Company,
thereby increasing concentration in liquid bleach.
The examiner found that (1) the effect of the acquisition of Clorox
by Proctor and Gamble may be to supress the competition of not
only Purex but also other small competitors; (2) the addition of
Clorox to the Proctor and Gamble line of soaps, detergents and
cleansers would add merchandising strength and support to Clorox
which was not available to the Clorox Chemical Company; and (3)
industry-wide concentration of the production and sale of household
liquid bleach may be increased.
Examiner Haycraft stated:
To determine whether this acquisition is in violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended, attention must given to that industry
in which the acquired corporation was engaged, and an attempt made
to evaluate the impact on competition in that industry growing out of the
acquisition. In order to do that, it is necessary to take into consideration
the size and experience of the acquiring corporation in the conduct of its
business prior to the acquisition, the manufacture and sale of products
sold by it over the past few years, and then to make an evaluation of
what the normal result probably will be when a corporation such as
Proctor and Gamble, the acquiring corporation, enters into the other
72. No. 6901, FTC, June 15, 1961.
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industry, and utilizes the same methods of operation that it utilized in
its prior fields of endeavor.73
The examiner then commented, again, on the fact that Proctor and
Gamble was a financially powerful and aggressive commercial organi-
zation which depends on advertising and sales promotion practices.
The hearing examiner concluded that the result of the acquisition
of Clorox by Proctor and Gamble probably would be the substantial
lessening of competition between respondent and Clorox and the
smaller manufacturers and distributors of household liquid bleach in
the United States. He added that there was as a result of the acquisi-
tion a definite tendency to create a monopoly in the respondent Proc-
tor and Gamble in the household bleach industry.
The Commission, with only three of the five commissioners sitting,
reversed and remanded the Proctor and Gamble decision on June
15, 1961. In so doing, it set forth what it felt the tests of illegality
should be in the case of a conglomerate merger:
The question in this proceeding thus is whether the proscribed effect may
in fact result from this particular acquisition where the only immediate
effect is the replacement of one competitor by another. In making this
determination, the same tests apply as in any other matter coming
within the purview of Section 7, but since a conglomerate acquisition
does not have the above-mentioned "automatic" effects of a vertical
or horizontal merger, such a determination is necessarily difficult to
make for a consideration of evidence relating solely to the competitive
situation existing in the relevant market prior to the acquisition and to
the pre-merger status of the acquired and acquiring corporations. Con-
sequently, a consideration of post-acquisition factors is appropriate. 74
The Commission remanded the case because it felt that the record
did not contain enough information. The hearing examiner was
ordered to receive evidence relating to the competitive situation as it
presently exists in the liquid bleach industry:
This evidence should relate to events occurring subsequent to November,
1958, and should include market share data in each of the geographical
regions specified on Page 17 of the initial decision, as well as information
directed to more clearly delineating the production and merchandising
facilities and techniques which have been utilized by Clorox under the
control of respondent.7 5
By looking at post-merger data, the Commission probably is adopt-
ing a short-lived test. An acquiring company can, and often does
leave everything as it was for some time after an acquisition. It is
clear, I think, that at the moment, no one, including the five com-
73. Id. at 50.




missioners, knows what the tests of illegality are in connection with a
conglomerate merger. These will no doubt be developed on a case-by-
case basis, but in the meantime there are paltry few sign posts to
guide the parties contemplating a conglomerate merger.
The acquisition of Arrow Brands, Inc. by Reynolds Metals Co. was
a vertical merger.76 In holding that the merger violated section 7
of the Clayton Act, the Commission relied upon the same reasoning
as Hearing Examiner Haycraft in Proctor & Gamble, which as we have
seen, was a conglomerate merger. In its opinion, the Commission said:
There were about eight companies engaged in this line of enterprise. A
number of these have been named above. Prior to the acquisition, all
were of a roughly equivalent competitive status, if looked at on a grand
scale. In other words, no company was very big and all were relatively
small. Some had advantages not shared by all, but they each had about
the same competitive capabilities. Also, they were active and aggressive
competitors. Prices were lower than those which prevailed in the
aluminum foil market as a whole. Success depended on competitive
prices, personal relationships, creative designing, the providing of services,
and other things....
After the acquisition, the balance of power in this all-competitive arena
shifted dramatically to Arrow Brands, Inc.7?
The opinion commented on the fact that Arrow had "drastically
reduced" its prices following the acquisition. There was evidence
that following the acquisition, Arrow sold at a loss. Testimony of
competitors that they could not survive under this type of com-
petition was related. The Commission commented:
The significance in the situation is that Arrow would lower its prices
and maintain them at low levels for an extended period, which it
could not have done before the merger. The acquisition gave it market
power which was so dramatically demonstrated.7 8
Apparently, the Commission agreed in Reynolds Metals with the
hearing examiner in Proctor & Gamble that when a large company
with money and know-how moves into a market in which there are
no companies as large, or with as much know-how, section 7 has been
violated. Its decision in Proctor & Gamble, however, casts doubt on
Reynolds Metals as a precedent. It will be interesting to see the
basis of the Commission's final opinion in Proctor & Gamble.
XII. SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COmmISSION ACT
The Federal Trade Commission has held that it can attack mergers
and acquisitions under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
76. No. 7009, FTC, Jan. 12, 1960 (commission order to cease and desist).
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 11.
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Act79 as well as section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In the initial decision in Foremost Dairies, Inc.,80 it was pointed
out by the hearing examiner that the complaint had alleged that the
constant and systematic eliminations of actual and potential com-
petitors by Foremost were all to the prejudice and injury of the
public and constituted unfair methods of competition and unfair
acts and practices within the intent and meaning of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
Early in the proceedings, the hearing examiner struck from the
complaint the section 5 allegations on the ground that the Commission
had no jurisdiction over the acquisitions under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. On interlocutory appeal, the Com-
mission reversed the examiner, stating:
The Commission being of the opinion that the hearing examiner was
in error in this respect, and that facts indicating the violation of Section
7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, may also indicate a violation of Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and, further, that practices
not technically within the scope of a specific section of the Clayton Act
may, nevertheless, constitute a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act; and, The Commission being of the further opinion that
in electing to charge a respondent in this case with violation both of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, and Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, the Commission acted in the exercise of its
administrative discretion and that in so doing, it made a decision on
which the hearing examiner has no authority to sit in judgment.81
At the close of the case supporting the complaint, the hearing ex-
aminer stated that he would take evidence with respect to the
section 5 charge, but would not rule on it. He would leave that up
to the Commission. Another reversal followed an interlocutory ap-
peal, the Commission stating: "The Section 5 charge presents questions
of law and fact which the Commission prefers to determine upon a
complete record. This includes as to such charges any proper defense
of the acquisition concerned which the respondent may wish to
offer." 8
2
The examiner had ruled that he was not going to require the
respondent to defend the section 5 charges and it was this ruling
which was reversed.
In his initial decision, Examiner Haycraft again dismissed the sec-
tion 5 charges. He restated his earlier thesis:
79. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958,). Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act states, in relevant part: "Unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,
are hereby declared unlawful."
80. No. 6495, FTC, Dec. 16, 1960 (initial order to cease and desist).
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id. at 6.
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It seems to me that when Congress amended Section 7 and gave us ad-
ditional authority, that it was intended to confine our activities to that
Section. We have been turned back every time we have attempted to
use Section 5 as a substitute for Section 7 or as a complement to it, or a
supplement to it, and I think it is a waste of time and effort.83
When Gulf Oil Corporation bought a large number of convertible
debentures of Union Oil Company a few years ago, it was rumored
that the Commission was going to attack the purchase under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The order to be issued,
presumably, would be, "Do not convert the debentures. Do not
exercise any control over Union." The Commission's power to do
this was not tested, as it did not issue a complaint in the Gulf-Union
transaction, and the matter is now believed to have been turned over
to the Department of Justice.
XIII. RELIEF
The relief generally sought by the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission today in section 7 cases is divestiture of
the acquired stock or assets. Sometimes, the order entered against
the offending acquirers seeks to accomplish things in addition to
divestiture.
In Docket 6820, for example, the Federal Trade Commission ordered
divestiture, but Automatic Canteen was also ordered for a period of
ten years to:
[C]ease and desist from acquiring, directly or indirectly, through sub-
sidiaries or otherwise, by merger, consolidation, purchase of physical
assets, or acquisition of stock or other share capital, any interest in any
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing vending machines
whose product has competed or competes to any extent with any vending
machine manufactured or assembled by respondent, its subsidiaries or
affiliates.84
The Commission now almost always insists upon the divestiture of
acquired assets "as a going concern."
In the Commission's final order in Pillsbury Mills, Chairman Kintner
stated, with respect to the order to restore a going concern:
This order is similar in many respects to orders previously entered by
the Commission on other Section 7 cases. Crown-Zellerbach Corporation,
54 FTC 569, (1957); Reynolds Metals Company, Docket 7009 (January 21,
1960); A. G. Spaulding Bros, Inc., Docket 6478, (March 30, 1960); We
believe that an order requiring the restoration of the acquired firms as
83. Id. at 78. Examiner Haycraft quoted from, and relied upon FTC v. East-
man Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
84. This order was contained in a consent decree. Automatic Canteen Co.
of America, 54 F.T.C. 1831, 1842 (1958).
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competitors is fully within the Commission's authority and is justified
here. Piecemeal divestiture will not correct the harm which has been
rendered competition.85
In Erie Sand & Gravel, the Commission stated:
The Commission has the power to issue an order which requires the
divestiture of an acquired property, where there is a violation of
Section 7 "in the manner and within the time fixed by said order." (15
U.S.C. 21). This is adequate authority to require divestiture of the ac-
quired property as a going, competing concern, rather than on a piecemeal
basis. In this case, the removal of an important competitor severely
restricts the sources of supply for lake sand purchases. To permit piece-
meal sale of the property would not correct the harm that has been
rendered to competition. Crown-Zellerbach Corporation. See also Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company, et al. 272 U.S. 554,
559 (1926). There, in upholding the Commission's order, the Court stated
that the words of the statute must be read in the light of its general
purpose and applied with a view to effectuate such purposes and that the
"[pireservation of established competition was the great end which the
legislature sought to secure."86
In International Paper Co.,87 the Commission ordered partial divesti-
ture by means of a voting trust which had ten years in which to sell
the acquired property. There were also many other provisions in
the nature of mandatory injunctions.
In Reynolds Metals Company the Commission ordered divestiture
of the acquired Arrow Brands, Inc., together with a new plant built
after the acquisition of Arrow. Reynolds was ordered to restore
Arrow to at least the same competitive standing it formerly had in
the Florist Foil industry at or around the time of the acquisition.
In Gulf Oil,88 Gulf was allowed to keep substantially all the assets
it acquired in its acquisition of Warren Petroleum, but was ordered
for a period of 10 years to make available a large percentage of its
liquified petroleum gas to independent distributors and dealers. Iron-
ically, the Commission's order in Gulf will be a dead letter in less
time, 10 years, than it will have taken the Commission and courts to
terminate the proceedings in Pillsbury.
A different twist in Gulf was a list of 23 firms to which Gulf could
not sell the limited number of assets which it was ordered to divest
under the terms of the consent decree.
Irston R. Barnes, speaking before the Federal Bar Association on
September 26, 1958, said:
To be effective, the order must restore the acquired firm as a going
85. No. 6000, FTC, Dec. 16, 1960, at 26.
86. No. 6670, FTC, Oct. 26, 1959, at 8.
87. 53 F.T.C. 1192, 1199 (1957).
88. No. 6689, FTC, Jan. 5, 1960 (consent order to cease and desist).
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concern and as an effective competitor. The divested company must be
adequately staffed, provided with a reasonable capitalization and adequate
working capital, and given the means quickly to regain its competitive
position in the market. An order which requires less fails to restore
the competition which was destroyed by the acquisition.
There is little question but that from the standpoint of the Com-
mission and the Department of Justice these words of Dr. Barnes
reflect the ideal. The ideal has not been achieved because of the
single greatest failure of section 7 enforcement-the long period of
time which elapses between the beginning of the government's in-
vestigation and final court review.
XIV. A DECADE OF DELAY
In a concurring opinion to the 1953 interlocutory appeal in Pills-
bury, Commissioner Mead said:
The Commission was established so that the public would get prompt
informed action when there is a reasonable probability that a trade act
or practice will injure competition. Prompt informed action is par-
ticularly necessary in cases of mergers which may be finally found to be
illegal. The passage of time may make much more difficult the task
of unscrambling the assets of the merged companies and restoring
competition to its original form.A9
These words of Commissioner Mead were succinct and accurate,
but hardly profound. If a company disappears from the market for
several years, it is difficult for it to resume its place in the competitive
scheme of things. A brand name which is a big seller in 1951 can
hardly expect to drop from sound and sight for ten years, and then
suddenly return with its customer appeal untarnished. Viewed in this
light, the Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission and
courts all have sorry records.
In 1951, Pillsbury acquired Ballard. In 1952, it acquired Duff.
Following an interlocutory appeal in 1953, in which the Commission
held that all "relevant factors" should be brought to light, years of
hearings took place. The Commission did not decide the case until
December 12, 1960, nine years after the acquisition of Ballard. Ap-
peals to the court remain in the future. The case still has not been
decided-by a court of appeals.
In July 1955, the Brillo Company acquired Williams. There have
been since then two interlocutory appeals by the Commission, dis-
cussed above at some length, but final action, much less final court
action, remains over the horizon.90
89. 50 F.T.C. 555, 575 (1953).
90. As this is written in mid-summer 1961.
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It was in June of 1953 that Crown Zellerbach acquired St. Helens
Paper Company. A Federal Trade Commission complaint followed on
February 15, 1954. Over three years later, an initial decision of the
hearing examiner was handed down. The Commission followed with
its decision exactly 10 months later, on December 26, 1957. An ap-
peal to the Ninth Circuit followed, and that Court of Appeals did
not decide the case until June 5, 1961, three and one-half years after
the decision of the Commission. In fairness to the Ninth Circuit, it
should be added that the record before it was voluminous, but three
and a half years is a long time.
As bad as are the records of Pillsbury and Crown-Zellerbach, the
Department of Justice case against Du Pont for its acquisition of
General Motors stock takes first prize. The complaint in that case
was issued in 1949. By skipping the court of appeals and going
directly to the Supreme Court, a decision in the case was finally
reached on June 3, 1957. Arguments over the proper relief, however,
were still bouncing from court to court well into the summer of 1961.
It is easy to call this situation disgraceful, and to cast blame in all
directions. It is much more difficult to offer affirmative proposals
which would seem to offer some hope in the so far losing battle with
section 7 delay.
Federal Trade Commission delays have resulted from several
factors. One of the main causes, I believe, has been the fact that
counsel supporting the complaint often were not ready to proceed
with hearings at the time the complaint was issued. Investigation by
trial counsel took place following the issuance of the complaint, and,
indeed, often took place while hearings were in progress. The main
reason for this procedure was that counsel supporting the complaint
had not had a hand in the initial investigation, and often found that
investigation inadequate as a basis for conducting hearings.
The recent re-organization at the Federal Trade Commission at-
tempts to remedy this situation. Trial attorneys will do their own
investigating, or at least participate in it. The new rules also call
for continuous hearings, rather than hearings at intervals. If this
rule is followed, delay will be drastically reduced.
Whether continuous hearings in complicated merger cases will con-
flict with due process is a question which will almost certainly find its
way to the appellate courts.
The Federal Trade Commission has traditionally and violently
opposed discovery procedures. One reason given in justification for
this position was that its hearings were at intervals, giving everyone
opportunity to prepare. Continuous hearings as called for in the
new rules presuppose wide discovery. The new rules allow much
1082 [ VOL. 14
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wider discovery than previously, and this will doubtlessly greatly aid
in reducing delay.
The courts, too, are attacking the problem of delay. In March
of 1960, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted the
Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted
Cases.9 1 The Handbook concerns itself almost entirely with anti-trust
cases. It is too lengthy to go into here, but its emphasis on effective
discovery should also result in less delay.
It is good that the Federal Trade Commission and courts are
working at the problem of delay. Unless the situation is radically
improved, without infringing upon the rights of respondents, delay
may enervate new section 7 just as effectively as judicial construction
did the old.
91. 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).

